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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case stems from Howard Green's efforts to stay one 
step ahead of his creditors, including the United States 
government. During several years of financial struggle, 
bankruptcy filings, flight from federal prosecution and 
ultimately jail time, Green underestimated his federal tax 
liabilities on his income tax returns in 1979, 1980 and 
1981. The IRS eventually caught up with Green and in 
1992 attempted to foreclose against all of his property, 
including property in Huntingdon Valley, Pennsylvania. 
Green responded that he had conveyed the Huntingdon 
Valley property to his wife in 1981, thus insulating it from 
foreclosure. The trial court deemed the conveyance 
fraudulent and set it aside. Green now appeals, and we 
affirm. 
 
I. Background 
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Green was president 
and chairman of the board of Fidelity America Financial 
Corporation and its three subsidiaries. In 1981, hefiled for 
corporate bankruptcy protection for the companies. 
According to a bankruptcy trustee's complaint against him, 
Green and other Fidelity officers had been conducting a 
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fraudulent financial scheme with the companies. See 
Kranzdorf v. Green, 582 F. Supp. 335, 337-38 (E.D. Pa. 
1983). Green allegedly persuaded a company employee to 
prepare financial statements "for use in inducing 
investments by limited partners and loans by commercial 
lenders." Id. at 337. Apparently, the loans were used to 
start new limited partnership syndications, which were not 
financially viable, in part because of Green's corporate 
waste. See id. at 337-38. 
 
During the years that Green's business scheme was 
"collapsing," (Lower Ct. Op. at 4) he was experiencing 
upheaval in his private life as well. In September 1979, 
Howard entered into an agreement for separation and 
property settlement with his first wife, Ina. Two months 
later, he met Mary Woodmansee, whom he married in April 
1980. Throughout this period, in tax years 1979, 1980 and 
1981, Howard substantially underreported his federal 
income tax liabilities. 
 
In 1981, Green transferred an interest in his residence to 
Mary. The validity of that transfer is the heart of this 
appeal. For context, however, we outline Howard's 
subsequent maneuvers. In 1981, Green liquidated a trust 
worth approximately $1.4 million. In 1983, the federal 
government indicted Green on charges of conspiracy, 
securities fraud, mail fraud and the filing of a false income 
tax return for the 1979 tax year. In June 1983, two months 
after his federal indictment, Green transferred a portion of 
his interest in his home to his children. In September 1983, 
Howard and Mary opened Maryland bank accounts (Mary 
disguising her appearance by wearing a black wig and 
glasses) to which they transferred money. Then theyfled to 
Maryland. A year later, officials apprehended Green in 
Baltimore, where he was redeeming coupons from his 
bearer bonds. He was carrying two sets of false 
identification at the time. Later in 1984, Green pleaded 
guilty to many counts of the indictment. He paid about $1 
million restitution and served 30 months in jail. 1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Howard was released from prison in 1987, but his machinations 
continued. The next year, he received an examination report letter from 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) proposing adjustments for the 1979, 
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In 1991, the IRS made assessments totaling $140,297 
against Green for the income he failed to report on his 
1979, 1980 and 1981 tax returns. Green has not 
challenged the accuracy of these assessments. A federal tax 
lien exists against all of a taxpayer's property on the date 
of the assessment if that assessment is not paid. 26 U.S.C. 
S 6321, 6322 (1989); see United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 
351, 352 n.1 (1964). Assessments are presumed to be valid, 
and establish a prima facie case of liability against a 
taxpayer. United States v. Vespe, 868 F.2d 1328, 1331 (3d 
Cir. 1989). Thus, by dint of its 1991 assessments against 
Green, the federal government had obtained a lien against 
all of his property, including the Huntingdon Valley 
property. Green, however, refused to pay the assessments, 
and in 1992 the IRS recorded a notice of lien against him. 
Green claims the government has no lien against the 
Huntingdon Valley property because he conveyed it to Mary 
and himself as tenants by the entirety in 1981. Courts look 
to state law to determine what rights a taxpayer has in the 
property the government seeks to reach. See Drye v. United 
States, 120 S. Ct. 474, 478 (1999). Under Pennsylvania 
law, property owned by tenants by the entirety is not 
subject to the debts of either spouse. See Stauffer v. 
Stauffer, 465 Pa. 558, 576 (1976). 
 
The government responds, and the district court agreed, 
that the conveyance was fraudulent and should be set 
aside under the actual fraud provisions of the Pennsylvania 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act (PUFCA). See  39 Pa. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1980 and 1981 tax years. He wrote a letter to the IRS contesting the 
adjustments. The next day, he granted a $300,000 mortgage on his 
residence to Roylan Finance Company. Howard had created Roylan, and 
installed Mary's mother, Ernestine Woodmansee, as its sole owner. 
Ernestine did not pay $300,000 for the mortgage, which was allegedly 
given in exchange for Ernestine's parental support to Mary over the 
years. In 1989, Howard and Mary executed a UCC-1financing statement 
that gave Roylan a security interest in all of their personal property. 
Lower Ct. Op. at 6. The statement was filed just two months before a 
judgment was entered against Howard in the Kranzdorf lawsuit. The trial 
court found as a matter of fact that the financing statement was filed in 
anticipation of this debt arising. 
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Stat. Ann. S 357 (1993) (repealed 1994).2 The trial court 
stated that actual fraud is presumed where a husband 
transfers property to a wife for inadequate consideration, 
and that the presumption may be rebutted by a showing 
that the conveyance was fair. Lower Ct. Op. at 9. The trial 
judge stated that any evidence of Green's solvency was 
"irrelevant" to the presumption of actual fraud. Id. at 9 n.7. 
Green disagrees, arguing that solvency is relevant as 
"evidence that the transfer was proper and not fraudulent." 
Appellant's Br. at 5. Specifically, Green contends that 
under Pennsylvania law, evidence of solvency conclusively 
rebuts the presumption of actual fraud. Appellant's Br. at 
4. 
 
II. Analysis 
 
We review the district court's findings of fact under the 
clearly erroneous standard. See Moody v. Sec. Pacific Bus. 
Credit Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 1992). We exercise 
plenary review of the trial court's legal interpretation and 
construction of PUFCA. See id. In doing so, we are bound 
by Pennsylvania law. See id. Thus, our task is to determine 
whether, by deeming evidence of solvency "irrelevant," the 
trial court substantially misstated Pennsylvania law on the 
weight to be given solvency in the actual fraud analysis of 
interspousal transfers. Among Pennsylvania jurists there 
have been confusing cross-currents on this question, as we 
shall see. But the most recent statement of Pennsylvania 
law grounds the presumption in the inadequacy of 
consideration, and minimizes any consideration of solvency. 
The trial judge therefore correctly interpreted and applied 
that law to this case. 
 
PUFCA, like most fraudulent conveyance statutes, 
recognizes two distinct types of fraud: actual fraud and 
constructive fraud. Historically, fraudulent transfer law 
"addressed transactions in which the debtor, by engaging in 
a transaction, had a specific intent to prevent or interfere 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Pennsylvania replaced the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act with 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act in 1994. However, PUFCA is still 
applicable to transfers that occurred before the February 1, 1994 
effective date of the new act, 12 Pa. C.S.A. S 5101 et seq. See United 
States v. Kudasik, 21 F. Supp. 2d 501, 506 n.2 (W.D. Pa. 1998). 
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improperly with collection efforts in order to retain some 
benefit for the debtor." Barry L. Zaretsky, Fraudulent 
Transfer Law as the Arbiter of Unreasonable Risk, 46 S.C. 
L. Rev. 1165, 1165 (1995) (emphasis added). However, 
because courts recognized "the difficulty of proving a 
transferor's specific intent, [they] developed principles of 
constructive fraud under which a transaction might be 
avoidable as fraudulent even in the absence of a showing of 
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud." Id. (emphasis 
added). Thus, the two bodies of fraudulent transfer law 
taken together provide that the debtor "may not dispose of 
his property with the intent (actual fraud) or the effect 
(constructive fraud) of placing it beyond the reach of 
creditors." COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND 
CREDITOR 127 (2d ed. 1971) (parenthetical phrases added). 
 
PUFCA defines and proscribes actual fraud as follows: 
"[e]very conveyance made and every obligation incurred 
with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed 
in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future 
creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future 
creditors." 39 Pa. Stat. Ann. S 357 (1993). 
 
A. Interspousal Presumption of Actual Fraud 
 
In most actual fraud cases, insolvency is one of several 
relevant factors or "badges of fraud" the court may consider 
as evidence of fraudulent intent. See Sheffit v. Koff, 175 Pa. 
Super. 37, 42 (1953). As early as 1939, however, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized a situation in 
which solvency was not relevant to the actual fraud inquiry: 
property transfers between husbands and wives for nominal 
consideration. See Iscovitz v. Filderman, 334 Pa. 585, 589 
(Pa. 1939). In that situation, the court stated, the transfer 
itself was sufficient to create a presumption of fraud, and 
only a showing of fair consideration could successfully 
rebut the presumption. See id. "Where the transaction is 
between husband and wife actual intent does appear where 
it is shown that there was a deed given for a nominal 
consideration. This is but a presumption of fact and places 
on the wife the burden of showing the fairness of the 
transaction." Iscovitz, 334 Pa. at 589. Moreover, because 
"family collusion by a debtor is so easy to execute and so 
difficult to prove, the evidence to sustain the claim of the 
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wife in such cases must be clear and satisfactory." Id. at 
589-90. Thus, in cases of interspousal transfer, whether 
there is a factual presumption of actual intent to defraud 
depends on whether there is adequate consideration for the 
transfer. The principle has been restated and applied 
numerous times in the past sixty years. See, e.g., County of 
Butler v. Brocker, 455 Pa. 343, 347-48 (1974); United States 
v. Klayman, 736 F. Supp. 647, 648 (E.D. Pa. 1990); United 
States v. Kudasik, 21 F. Supp.2d 501, 507 (W.D. Pa. 1998). 
This Court recently discussed the continuation of the 
principle under Pennsylvania's new fraudulent transfer 
statute. See In re Blatstein, 192 F.3d 88, 97-98 (3d Cir. 
1999). Blatstein also highlights the more significant role 
solvency plays in constructive fraud, stating that under 
PUFCA's successor statute, when constructive fraud is at 
issue, the spouse may defeat the fraud claim by proving 
either fair consideration or solvency. See id. at 99. 
 
The trial court here specifically stated that it was 
reviewing this transaction for actual fraud, not constructive 
fraud. Lower Ct. Op. at 9. The trial judge found as a matter 
of fact that the conveyance was between husband and wife, 
and found as a matter of fact that consideration for the 
conveyance was not fair. The Greens do not challenge either 
of these findings, and the evidence suggests they are quite 
correct. Thus, the judge correctly construed PUFCA and 
correctly determined that the facts gave rise to a 
presumption of actual fraud regardless of whether Howard 
was solvent. 
 
B. Relevance of Solvency in Rebutting Presumption of 
Actual Fraud 
 
Green contends that even if the trial court correctly 
applied the presumption, under Pennsylvania law he can 
wholly rebut it by presenting evidence of solvency. But in 
its most recent pronouncement on interspousal transfers 
and the application of the fraud presumption in actual 
fraud cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court grounded its 
analysis on the question of fair consideration. See County of 
Butler, 455 Pa. at 348. County of Butler minimized any 
significance of solvency in the analysis of interspousal 
transfers for inadequate consideration. See id. at 347-48. 
The trial court reviewing the Greens' predicament correctly 
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followed suit, as have other federal courts. See, e.g., 
Klayman, 736 F. Supp. at 648; Kudasik, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 
507. 
 
Resisting the implications of County of Butler, Green cites 
dictum from a 1957 case stating that a wife may rebut the 
presumption of actual fraud arising from an interspousal 
transfer alternatively by showing fair consideration or by 
showing "that the husband's liabilities did not exceed his 
then remaining assets." Smith v. Arrell, 388 Pa. 117, 118 
(1957). Green's argument here is not frivolous, because 
Smith does illustrate that Pennsylvania courts have 
occasionally equivocated on the relationship between 
solvency and actual fraud in interspousal transfers. For 
instance, the court in Smith cited three cases to support its 
statement that solvency is a defense to the interspousal 
presumption of actual fraud. First, the court cited to 
Iscovitz, which mandated review of "the entire course of 
conduct of the grantor," including insolvency. Iscovitz, 334 
Pa. at 589. But Iscovitz then directed that, if this review 
revealed a conveyance between husband and wife for 
nominal consideration, the court should presume actual 
intent to defraud, and dismiss the presumption only on a 
showing that the transaction was fair. Id. Second, the Smith 
court cited to People's Savings & Dime Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Scott to support the notion of a "solvency defense" to the 
interspousal presumption of actual fraud. 303 Pa. 294, 297 
(1931). But People's Savings dealt with constructive fraud, 
and not actual fraud, so its application here is doubtful. Id. 
at 296. Finally, the Smith court cited to dicta in Queen- 
Favorite Building & Loan Ass'n v. Burstein, suggesting that 
a presumption of actual fraud arising from an interfamily 
transfer may be offset by evidence, conjointly, of fair 
consideration and solvency. See 310 Pa. 219, 223 (1933). 
But the outcome of Queen-Favorite did not turn on a 
showing of solvency, thus diminishing the authority of the 
language used in the opinion. Moreover, the Queen-Favorite 
court cited in support of its "solvency" language People's 
Savings and Shaver v. Mowry, 262 Pa. 381, 386 (Pa. 1918), 
both of which dealt with constructive fraud, a distinct legal 
concept in which solvency is relevant as a defense. 
 
In short, Smith captures the vacillation of the 
Pennsylvania courts in seeking to evaluate the significance 
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of solvency to the presumption of interspousal fraud. 
Green's citation of Smith shrewdly highlights strands of 
Pennsylvania law that have suggested that solvency may be 
a defense to the presumption of interspousal fraud. But his 
effort fails here for two reasons. First, County of Butler 
overruled sub silentio the Smith dicta that Green cites. 
County of Butler stated that for purposes of actual fraud, a 
debtor "does not have to render himself insolvent. . . in 
order to establish a fraudulent intent. . . . [The creditor] 
need only show an intent to hinder, delay or defraud on the 
part of the [debtor] to make the conveyance fraudulent. Our 
cases have established the principle that as between 
husband and wife fraud is presumptively present when the 
conveyance is for a nominal consideration and is challenged 
by creditors . . . ." County of Butler, 455 Pa. at 347 (internal 
quotation and citations omitted). Put another way, a debtor 
may remain solvent and still face a presumption of actual 
fraud by making an interspousal transfer for nominal 
consideration. Further, Smith's congruence with the present 
case is questionable. In Smith, a wife who received a 
$25,000 judgment note from her husband after loaning him 
$10,000 protested application of the interspousal transfer 
presumption on the ground that she was still single at the 
time of the transaction. The Smith court mentioned in 
passing that solvency was a possible defense, but the 
debtor did not rely on it there and the court did not apply 
it. Thus, despite the existence of Smith, the trial judge did 
not err in following the teachings of County of Butler, the 
more recent and more analogous case. In light of County of 
Butler, the judge was certainly not incorrect to deem 
solvency substantially "irrelevant" in evaluating the 
presumption that Howard's transfer to Mary was 
fraudulent. The present facts are that the transfer was to a 
spouse for a wholly inadequate consideration. No matter 
how healthy Howard Green's balance sheet might have 
been, the factual presumption of actual fraud would 
survive. We therefore regard the trial court's assessment of 
Pennsylvania law as applied here to be substantially 
accurate. On the present facts, particularly where there is 
clear and convincing evidence of inadequate consideration, 
solvency is an inconsequential factor. 
 
Under PUFCA, "[f]air consideration is given for property 
or obligation: (a) [w]hen, in exchange for such property or 
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obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor and in good faith, 
property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied; or 
(b) [w]hen such property or obligation is received in good 
faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt in 
amount not disproportionately small as compared with the 
value of the property or obligation obtained." 39 Pa. Stat. 
Ann. S 353 (1993). The trial court found as a matter of fact 
that Mary did not give fair consideration, and the Greens do 
not challenge this finding of fact. Thus, Mary did not 
successfully rebut the presumption of actual intent. 
 
C. The Presumption is in Accord with Subsequent Events 
 
Moreover, the judge did not wear blinders in presuming 
that Howard acted with actual fraudulent intent. The court 
took account of the totality of the circumstances, an 
approach clearly endorsed by Godina v. Oswald, which 
states that "[s]ince fraud is usually denied, it must be 
inferred from all facts and circumstances surrounding the 
conveyance, including subsequent conduct." 206 Pa. Super. 
51 (1965) (quoting Sheffit, 175 Pa. Super. at 41.). Howard's 
subsequent conduct included creating the Roylan Finance 
Company and installing Mary's mother as its owner solely 
for the purpose of granting a mortgage on the property, just 
days after contesting the IRS's claim for taxes owed. 
Subsequent conduct also involved granting Roylan a 
security interest in all of his personal property shortly 
before the $17 million judgment was entered against him in 
the bankruptcy trustee's lawsuit. These facts reinforce the 
trial court's ultimate conclusion that, all things considered, 
Howard's proffered evidence of solvency was "irrelevant" to 
the question of his intent to defraud creditors. 
 
D. Howard's Solvency 
 
Finally, we note that despite his doggedness on this 
issue, Howard likely cannot prove that he was solvent as of 
April 13, 1981, the date he transferred the property to 
Mary. A person is insolvent under the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act when "the present, fair, salable value of his 
assets is less than the amount that will be required to pay 
his probable liability on his existing debts as they become 
absolute and matured." 39 Pa. Stat. Ann. S 352(1) (1993). 
"Debts" are defined as "any legal liability whether matured 
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or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute,fixed, 
or contingent." 39 Pa. Stat. Ann. S 351 (1993). The United 
States is considered a creditor "from the date when the 
obligation to pay income taxes accrues," essentially on April 
15 of the year following the tax year in question. United 
States v. St. Mary, 334 F. Supp. 799, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
Further, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found that 
awareness of a probable legal action against a debtor 
amounts to a debt for purposes of determining solvency. 
See Baker v. Geist, 457 Pa. 73, 76-77 (1974). 
 
As of April 15, 1980, Howard was in debt to the United 
States for the underreported amount of his 1979 federal 
income taxes, $51,845. And Howard transferred the 
property to Mary just two months after Fidelity filed for 
bankruptcy protection. It was this filing, and the 
appointment of a bankruptcy trustee, that led to the 1983 
complaint against Howard and the eventual $17 million 
judgment against him. Thus, at the time Howard conveyed 
the property, he was on notice of a possible suit by the 
bankruptcy trustee. Howard could reasonably estimate that 
the tax debt and bankruptcy debt together would reach 
several million dollars. These looming debts, when 
compared with his "collapsing" portfolio, suggest that 
Howard was insolvent at the time of the transfer to Mary. 
So even if solvency were relevant to the question of actual 
fraud in this case -- we repeat that it is not -- Howard's 
arguments are still unavailing. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
Evidence of solvency was not a barrier to applying the 
presumption of actual fraud arising from Howard's transfer 
of property to Mary for nominal consideration. Evidence of 
solvency would not have been enough to rebut that 
presumption once applied. Moreover, the evidence suggests 
that Howard was not solvent at the time of the transfer. 
Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court's interpretation of 
PUFCA, the presumption that the conveyance was 
fraudulent and the finding that the Greens did not rebut 
the presumption. 
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